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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALFRED HAYDEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
RUSSELL CEDERLUND, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF R.ESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7956 
On Decemher 5, 1949, one Dorn Hayden, son of 
appellant, was driving his father's 1942 Dodge ton and 
one-half truck east on 33rd South Street (T. 38). The 
left front hand window of said truck was knocked half 
out and one back window was knocked out (T. 38). The 
record indicates that it was the intention of the driver 
of this vehicle to turn left on West Temple Street at 
33rd South Street (T. 43); that the vehicle's wheels 
were cramped to rnake such turn (T. 39); that the driver 
alleges he extended his arm, or put his hand out, through 
the broken window to indicate his intention to turn left 
at a point about a hundred feet, or something like, that, 
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from the intersection (T. 39); that the truck was travel-
ing about fifteen miles per hour (T. 40); that while the 
turn was being negotiated, appellant's truck was struck 
in the rear by the vehicle being driven by respondent, in 
the left rear corner of the pig tank (T. 40). Dorn 
Hayden further testified that: He heard no warning 
signal nor siren (T. 39, 54, 60, 61, 62); that he saw no 
cars behind him prior to the accident (T. 48, 51); that 
he did not see the highway patrol car (the other vehicle 
involved in the accident) before the crash (T. 51); that 
he did not look in his rear view mirror before attempting 
to turn (T. 51). 
The respondent, Russell Cederlund, testified that on 
the date involved he was in an accident at the site above 
referred to (T. 63, 64). That he was driving a 1949 Ford 
automobile (T. 63) and that he was proceeding with the 
red dome light and the siren on (T. 64). That he observed 
no signal whatsoever given by the driver of appellant's 
truck ( T. 64) ; that he was proceeding to the scene of an 
accident (T. 64); that his vehicle was traveling at a 
speed of approximately forty-five or fifty miles per 
hour (T. 74); that he had no opportunity to avoid the 
accident ( T. 69). 
F'actually then, from the record, we have two vehicles 
trav~ling in the same direction on a city street. One, 
the truck, attempting a left turn at an intersection. The 
other, an emergency vehicle, proceeding at a high rate 
of speed to the scene of an accident. There is a conflict 
in the testimony as to an arm signal and as to whether 
or not the emergency vehicle was making use of i tH 
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flashing dome light and siren. Driver of appellent's 
truck admits. that he observed nothing coming up behind 
him and that he did not look to the rear. The trial co-a..rt 
refused to direct a verdict but did grant a verdict for 
defendant and respondent non obstante veredicto. The 
trial court concluded that in view of Section 41-6-69, 
U.C.A. 1953, the operator of appellant's truck, for fail-
ing to look for traffic approaching from his rear, was 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law and that such 
negligence was a pro~imate cause of the collision. 
Plaintiff and his son were engaged in a joint enter-
prise and plaintiff admits that the negligence, if any, of 
the driver of the truck may be imputed to plaintiff-
passenger. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
NEITHER DIRECTED VERDICTS NOR JUDGMENTS 
NON OBSTANTE VERDICTO OFFEND THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY. 
POINT II 
THE DRIVER OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS CON-
TRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND 
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE COLLISION; THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
SO HOLDING. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NEITHER DIRECTED VERDICTS NOR JUDGMENTS 
NON OBSTANTE VERDICTO OFFEND THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY. 
3 
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The power of arresting the rendition of judgment 
after verdict has always been exercised by the common 
law courts of England and, as a general rule, in the 
United States as necessarily appurtenant to their con-
trol over the causes pending in them. Wentworth v. 
Wentworth, ·2 Minn. 277, 72 Am. Dec. 97. However, we 
are not unaware of the decisions of this court holding, 
prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure of 
January 1, 1950, that a motion for judgment notwith-
standing-the-verdict was not recognized in this juris-
diction. Kirk v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 143, 89 P. 458; 
Yerrick v. District Court, 48 Utah 619, 161 P. 55; and 
Morris on v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772. These 
cases preceded the adoption of Rules of Civil Procedure 
above referred to. 
The right to a jury trial according to the rules of the 
common law is preserved by the Seventh Amendment to 
the Constitution. It is a well established principle of 
the common law that although questions of fact must 
be decided by the jury and may not be reexamined by 
the court, the question whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to raise a question of fact to be presented to the 
jury is a question of law to be decided by the court. Rule 
50, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides a procedure for 
the determination of this question of law by the courts. 
Rule 50 (a) provides for a motion for a directed verdict 
at the close of the eviden0e and before the case is sub-
Initted to the jury. It enables the court to determine 
whether there is any question of fact to be submitted 
to the jury and whether any verdict other than the one 
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directed would be erroneous as a matter of law. Rule 
50 (b) authorizes the court to reserve the decision of 
this question of law until after the case has been sub-
mitted to the jury. After the court decides that a verdict 
should have been directed, it may set aside the verdict 
of the jury and enter a judginent notwithstanding-the-
verdict. We concede that a motion for judgment not-
withstanding-th~-verdict cannot be granted unless, as 
a matter of law, the opposing party failed to make a case 
and a verdict in movant's favor should have been 
directed. Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Duncan, Ark. 
(1940), 61 S. Ct. 189, -311 U. S. 243, 85 L. Ed. 147. 
The court may not weigh the evidence on such a motion .. 
George v. Leonard, D.C.S.C. (1949), 84 Fed. Supp. 205. 
But, for example, in personal injury actions, if the evi-
dence shows as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's negli-
gence was the cause of his injuries, the defendant is 
entitled to a judgment n.o.v. Atlantic Coast LineR·. Co. 
v. Mitchell, CCA 5th (1946), 157 F. 2d 880. Before Rule 
50 was adopted, January 1, 1950, the law in this state· 
was admittedly otherwise. 
For further and additional authority, we refer the 
Court to the works of Barron and Holtzoff, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Sec. 1071, et seq., Vol. 2. 
Appellant's contention that he was denied his right 
to a jury trial in violation of the Constitution is without 
merit. 
; 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE DRIVER OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS CON-
TRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND 
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE COLLISION; THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
SO HOLDING. 
The memorandum decision of the Honorable F. W. 
Keller, District Judge·, recites in part: 
" * * * The front end of the automobile driven by 
the defendant struck the left end of a tank extend-
ing across the rear of the truck when the truck 
had so far completed the turn that it was approxi-
mately three feet from the center line of Thirty-
third South Street. 
" * * * There was no obstacle between the truck 
and the patrol car that would have prevented the 
driver of the truck from seeing the patrol car 
had he glanced back or looked in a properly 
adjusted rear view mirror. 
"I am called upon to determine whether the 
action of the driver of the truck in making a left 
hand turn at the intersection without looking to 
ascertain whether the movement could be made 
with safety is negligence in law which was a 
proximate cause of the collision, • • • The most 
pertinent legislative enactm'ent applying to the 
question is Section 57-7-133, as amended, U.C.A. 
1943 (41-6-69, U.C.A. 1953). The applicable part 
of which reads as follows : 
"(a) No person shall turn a vehicle at an 
intersection unless the vehicle is in 
position upon the roadway as re-
quired in Section 57-7-130 ( .f 1-6-66 U. 
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C. A. 1953), or turn a vehicle to enter 
a private road or driveway or other-
wise turn a vehicle from a direct 
course or move right or left upon a 
roadway unless and until such mov-e-
ment can be made with reasonable 
safety. No person shall turn any 
vehicle without giving an appropriate 
signal in the manner hereinafter pro-
vided in the event any other traffic 
may be affected by such movement." 
"The significant portions of the section 
quoted are underlined. While it is true that giving 
the arm signal indicating a left hand turn may 
apprise others on the road of the driver's inten-
tion, it is not an act which in any way informs the 
driver giving the signal of what the situation is. 
I conclude that the language underlined placed 
a duty on the driver of the automobile about to 
make a left turn to take reasonable measures to 
inform himself of the presence of other automo-
biles. Ordinarily that duty can only be performed 
by glancing backward or looking in a rear view 
mirror to ascertain if there is traffic approaching 
from the rear. The driver of the truck in this 
case did not do this and I eonclude that his. failure 
was negligence as a matter of law. As heretofore 
stated, had he glanced to the rear or looked in his 
rear view mirror at any time during the interval 
that he says he had his hand extended from the 
left window of the car, he would have seen a high-
way patroll ear proceeding at a speed three times 
that at which the truck was traveling and would 
have known that he could not, as he did not, make 
the left turn without being struck. I therefoi'e con-
clude that his negligence was a proximate cause 
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of the collision and resulting injury to the plain-
tiff." 
We respectfully submit that the sole question before 
this Court is as to whether or not the violation of the 
statute was as a matter of law negligence and that such 
negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. Such 
the trial court held and, we are of the opinion, held 
correctly. In the case of Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal 
Company, 92 Utah 474, 69 P. 2d 502, this court said, in 
sustaining the holdings in Smith v. Mine and Smelter 
Supply Company, 32 Utah 21, 88 P. 683, and White v. 
Shipley, 48 Utah 496, 160 P. 441, 444, quoting from the 
latter case; 
"When a standard of duty or care is fixed 
by law or ordinance, and such law or ordinance 
has reference to the safety of life, limb, or prop-
·erty then, as a matter of necessity, a violation of 
such law or ordinance constitutes negligence." 
The case of White v. Shipley, supra, was decided by 
this court on October 7, 1916 and the court in discussing 
the above rule did say: 
"We applied that to depositing and maintain-
ing dynamite in a city in violation of an ordinance 
(Smith v. Mining, etc Co., 32 Utah 21, 88 Pac. 
683), to the operation of a steam railway (Rogers 
v. Railroad, 32 Utah 376, 90 Pac. 1075, 125 Am. 
st. Rep. 876), and of a street railway (Jens('n 1:. 
Utah Light & Ry. Co .. , 42 Utah 415, 132 Pac. 8). 
These were all dangerous instrumentalities, the 
maintenance or operation of which involved safety 
of life, limb and property. But that doctrine has 
no application to one merely driving a team or 
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other vehicle not itself a dangerous instrumen-
tality on the wrong side of a street in vio1ation 
of an ordinance. Whether to do so constitutes 
negligence is dependent upon the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case and, generally, is a ques-
tion of fact and not of law. It, let it be conceded, 
ordinarily is evidence of negligence for the con-
sideration of the jury, but cannot as such be 
declared by the court as here was done. And then 
the charge was here especially erroneous because 
of the excavations and torn-up condition of the 
street. It may be that in view of all the circum-
stances, due care, as matter of fact, required the 
defendants, as is contended by the respondent, to 
have driven around or down the block and then 
back on the side of the street where the package 
was to be delivered; but the court was not justi-
fied in saying that as matter of law. • • • " 
(Emphasis added.) 
thus declaring that the violation of an Ogden City 
ordinance, by the driver of a team and wagon, was not 
negligence as a matter of law. In that case the vehicle 
was driven down the wrong side of the street in viola-
tion of the ordinance and was so driven because there 
was an excavation in the center of the street which pre-
vented the driver from crossing from one side to the 
other. No such factual situation is presented in the 
instant case. We submit that in the case of WhUe v. 
Shipley, supra, that had there not been an obstruction 
in the center of the roadway that it would most certainly 
have been negligence per se to drive a vehicle against 
traffic on the wrong side of the street. That point is 
not here in issue but is suggested for the purpose of 
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illustrating the propriety of a directed verdict in situ-
ations of the latter nature. 
"When Mr. Justice Holmes wrote The Com-
mon Law, he prophesied that the time would come 
when the jury would never be allowed to decide 
the entire fault issue, and would participate in its 
determination only when the facts of the defend-
ant's conduct were in doubt; that, in such cases, 
the judge would state a specific standard of con-
duct in his charge, and would instruct the jury 
that if the defendant's conduct did not conform to 
that standard, the jury should find him guilty of 
negligence. Were this the practice, the judge 
would have the function of determining the ethical 
portion of the fault issue, and the jury's function 
would be strictly fact finding. While the prophecy 
has not yet come true in general negligence prac-
tice, s01nething like the procedure which was 
anticipated has been used in negligence per se 
cases. In most American jurisdictions it has 
usually been said that the violation of a criminal 
statute is negligence in itself." 
See, The Relation of Criminal Statute and Tort Liability, 
46 Harvard Law Review, pages 453 et seq. 
We think, in negligence per se cases, that the viola-
tion of a criminal statute (or ordinance) is negligence 
in law; this court has so held. In the case of North v. 
Cartwright, Utah, 229 P. 2d 871, in an unanimous opinion, 
the court said with reference to certain statutes under 
Title 41, U.C.A. 1953, setting forth traffic rules and 
regulations, that: 
"These statutes were promulgated for the 
protection of the public and to safeguard prop-
10 
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erty, life and limb of persons using the highways 
from accidents of the type here involved. Viola-
tions of these statutes then, constitute negligence 
in law. This doctrine of the law has be·en stead-
fastly adhered to by this court and generally in 
other courts throughout the United States." 
The court went on to cite Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal 
Company, 92 Utah 474, 69 P. 2d 502, 506, and White v. 
Shipley, supra, and, by implication if nothing more, 
abandoned the limitation discussed herein above, placed 
on the rnle by the latter case. 
In Morby v. Rogers, Utah, 252 P. 2d 231, 235, our 
court said: 
" * * * the rule prevailing in this jurisdiction (is) 
that a law violation is negligence as a matter of 
law * * * ." 
Citing also North v. Cartwright, supra, but, sustaining 
refusal of a directed verdict on other grounds. The· 
case of Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Utah, 249 P. 2d 213, reiterates 
the rule that the violation of a city ordinance establishes 
negligence as a matter of law; reversing, however, the 
lower court's order directing a verdict for defendant on 
the legal cause problem in negligence per se cases. No 
such problem is present in the instant case because "but 
for" the turning into the path of the emergency vehicle, 
the accident herein occurring and the resultant injuries 
therefrom, would have been avoided. That is to say, 
the emergency vehi·ele would have in its direct course of 
travel safely passed appellant's vehicle. 
11 
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Appellant cites in support of his Point II: 
Martin v. Stevens, Utah, 243 P. 2d 747. 
Stickle v. Union Pacific R. Co., Utah 251 P. 2d 867. 
Lloyd v. Southern Pacific Co., (Cal. App.) 245 P. 2d 
583. 
Turner v. McMillan, 140 Ore. 407, 14 P. 2d 294. 
Burns v. Standring, et al., 148 Wash. 291, 268 P. 866. 
With these authorities we have no quarrel. However, 
the rules therein promulgated do not go to the meat of 
the matter herein at issue, i.e., the relation of criminal 
statutes to tort liability and the question of negligence 
per se where the act violating the statute is the proximate 
cause of the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
Concluding, it is the contention of the writer that 
Section 41-6-69, U.C.A. 1953, places a burden upon the 
operator orf a vehicle not to deviate to right or left from 
his course without first ascertaining that he can reason-
ably do so. The failure to so do is negligence per se and 
when such negligence, as in the instant cause, results in 
an accident as a proximate cause thereof, recovery is 
bared. The evidentiary facts are of such conclusive 
character as to require all reasonable minds to conclude 
that the ultimate fact of contributory negligence caused 
this accident. Where the unconflicting evidence show~. 
as here, that the operator of appellant's vehicle exer-
cised no care whatsoever to ascertain whether or not he 
12 
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could safely negotiate a turn, it became a question of 
law whether or not a verdict should be directed non 
obstante verdicto. Further, there being nothing in the 
record to indicate that the trial court acted arbitrarily 
in the matter, the ruling of the lower court should remain 
undisturbed. 
Du!iflg the year in which our court rendered its 
decision in the case of White v. Shipley, supra, i.e., 1916, 
there were but thirty-one (31) traffic vehicle fatalities 
on the highways of this state. By 1941, the toll had 
reached an astounding two hundred and five (205); and, 
still steadily increasing, by 195'2, two hundred and forty-
six (246). In view of this retrogressive progress, can 
it be said that the Legislature, in its wisdom and proba-
ble desperation, did not expressly enact this statute in 
1941 to safeguard property, life and limb of persons 
using our highways from accidents of the type here 
involved. We think not. 
Mr. Justice Holmes said: "Sound policy lets los·ses 
lie where they fall, except where a special reason can 
be shown for interference." We submit that when the 
court in tort cases adjudges that money is to be given 
to a plaintiff, it also adjudges that it is to be taken from 
a defendant. The economic security of defendants is 
usually as important as the economic security of plain-
tiffs. Let it be further said that the defendant here was, 
in the course of his employment and in the fullfillment 
of his duty to the 1notoring public, proceeding to the 
scene of another accident which, in all probability, could 
13 
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have been avoided by a degree of care no greater than 
that called for by the statute here invoked. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General 
A. ttorneys for Respondent. 
14 
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